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Introduction 
Technological and scientific innovation is widely recognised as a major determinant of 
productivity growth and economic competitiveness.1 For companies that are capable of 
harnessing it, innovation is the magical ingredient that underpins new products and 
business models.2 An enterprise that is able to innovate in a commercially-viable manner is 
well-placed to outperform its competitors and create value for investors, customers and 
other stakeholders.3 Innovation is therefore important to securing the long-term success of 
many companies. 
The innovative capacity, development and harnessing of innovation in companies is shaped 
not only by market incentives but also by internal firm governance structures.4  
Successful companies that innovate well are often associated with the following 
characteristics: 
(a) An entrepreneurial spirit in corporate leadership and the workforce, and an 
enterprising culture in the firm generally. This also means a willingness to explore 
and take risks, and to dare to venture into the ‘weird’ and different;5 
(b) A dedication of investment into research and development, in terms of generally 
advancing scientific research but also in specific innovations;6 
(c) A long-termist approach to developing and growing the company.7 
                                                          
*DPhil (Oxford); Managing Director, Barker & Associates Ltd, Honorary Associate, Centre for Ethics and Law, 
University College London. 
** Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College London. 
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Strategy” Harvard Business Review (June 2015). 
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The above qualities suggest an intimate connection between corporate governance and 
innovation in companies. The empirical literature that we survey has sought to determine 
which corporate governance factors affect a company’s investment or spend in research 
and development, and the level of innovation output (such as in the number patents filed). 
We find that empirically accepted firm-based factors that promote innovation may however 
be incompatible with  well accepted corporate governance standards that are upheld in 
major securities markets such as in the US and UK. 
Questions can be raised as to whether certain conventions in corporate governance 
standards promote or indeed hinder innovation in companies.8 Corporate governance 
standards have become increasingly convergent around a shareholder-centred model of 
accountability around the world,9 partly due to the theoretical appeal of the ‘agency-based’ 
perspective of economic relations10 within the firm and the practical financial interests of 
shareholders11 that champion this model of corporate governance. The globally dominant 
corporate governance standards are referred to in this article as based on a ‘shareholder-
centred agency-based’ model. This article explores where the tensions lie between these 
globally dominant corporate governance standards and the firm-based factors that promote 
innovation. We flesh out the implications for these standards and the continuing trend of 
standardisation. 
Section A discusses the nature of ‘shareholder-centred agency based’ corporate governance 
standards and their rise in international capital markets. This Section argues that although 
the key characteristics of such standards are not necessarily antagonistic to promoting 
innovation, the underlying theoretical model has little to contribute to promoting 
innovation.12 This is because it focuses excessively on incentive-based individual economic 
behaviour, neglecting the enterprise context of the firm. This underlying theoretical model 
does not cater adequately for advancing the needs of coordination within the enterprise 
and the pursuit of collective enterprise success, ultimately affecting the usefulness of 
corporate governance standards based on such a model.   
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11 The rise of institutional investors and asset managers as major global shareholders is a key factor for 
influencing corporate governance standards maintained by many securities markets. Global securities markets 
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Section B argues that there is significant consistency between a resource-based theoretical 
perspective of the firm and empirical research findings on the corporate governance factors 
relevant for promoting innovation. We discuss the nature and key characteristics of this 
theoretical perspective and how it practically supports the promotion of firm innovation. 
We highlight the tensions between the needs of firm innovation and the application of 
‘shareholder-centred agency-based’ corporate governance standards. 
Section C proceeds to suggest how ‘shareholder-centred agency based’ corporate 
governance standards may be adjusted to reflect the needs for promoting firm innovation. 
We argue that the resource-based theoretical perspective pursues the same ultimate 
objective as ‘shareholder-centred agency-based’ corporate governance model, ie corporate 
success, but more accurately and holistically takes into account of the productive activities 
and enterprise of the firm. We advocate that corporate governance standards should 
embody both individualistic and collective economic behaviour in order to better cater for 
the needs of promoting innovation. We make some suggestions for key adjustments in 
particular with relation to Boards. We are of the view that Boards, shareholders and 
stakeholders can all be viewed differently from a resource-based perspective, giving us a 
new basis for the adjustment of prevailing corporate governance standards. Boards should 
ensure that companies have adequate access to a range of resources for innovation and also 
have a role to play in monitoring that such resources are harnessed and well-utilised. We 
critically examine the template in the UK Corporate Governance Code and make suggestions 
on adjusting provisions on Board structures, responsibilities and composition, so that Boards 
can better serve the purposes of firm innovation. Finally, this Section also reflects on the 
implications of our arguments for the observed trend of global standardisation of 
‘shareholder-centred agency-based’ corporate governance standards. We are of the view 
that excessive prescriptions in corporate governance standards are probably sub-optimal for 
promoting innovation, but we propose a moderated form of standardisation that caters to 
the needs of global securities markets. Section D concludes. 
A. Conventional Corporate Governance Standards and Firm Innovation 
Corporate governance models have been developed in theory since Berle and Means 
investigated in the 1930s into the implications of the ‘modern corporation’ for the allocation 
of powers within a corporate structure.13 As Moore and Petrin14 point out, although a 
number of theoretical models of corporate governance have been debated upon over the 
years in academia, across inter-disciplinary fields in economics, law and organisation, the 
model of corporate governance that has influenced most profoundly the modern 
development of corporate law and governance standards (which may be in Listing Rules of 
securities markets or ‘soft law’, i.e. in non-binding codes of best practices) is the ‘orthodox’ 
contractarian model of corporate governance.  
                                                          
13 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (NY: Macmillan, 1932). 
14 Marc T Moore and Martin Petrin, Corporate Governance: Law, Regulation and Theory (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2017) at ch2. 
The ‘orthodox’ contractarian model of corporate governance highlights corporate 
governance as essentially economic and contractual relations. In 1937, Coase’s seminal work 
“The Nature of the Firm”15 provided the foundation upon which the contractarian 
conception of the corporation became a dominant intellectual paradigm. The firm is 
characterised as a nexus of transactions that are ‘internalised’ because of the transaction 
cost-efficiencies of such arrangements compared to market-based contracting.  
The contractarian approach sees the firm as a nexus of contracts entered into by volition, 
and as a structure that internalises a web of these arrangements. The individuality of these 
economic transactions remain paramount in relation to allocation of powers and rights and 
this model does not treat the firm as a collective institution of its own salience. Hence, the 
role of corporate law, boosted by the rise of the law and economics movement, deals with 
making such contractual relations efficacious. Staunch contractual theorists in corporate law 
support the role of corporate law as an enabling or facilitative framework so that 
contracting parties may decide how their relations may be governed.16  Brudney17 and 
Bebchuk18  have pointed out that it is a myth that constituents in a corporation actively 
engage in contractual bilateralism to determine the substantive governance of their 
relations.  However theorists argue that the contractarian model can be supported on the 
basis of ‘hypothetical bargains’.  
Hypothetical bargains19 are premised upon models of economic behaviour on the part of the 
constituents of the firm.  From the 1970s, theoretical milestones have been reached in 
establishing such models of economic behaviour. Alchian and Demsetz20 analyse 
transactional behaviour within the firm in terms of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ contracts 
according to the efficiency needs of each constituent and conclude that shareholders are 
‘special’ as they make open-ended contracts to invest their capital into a firm but bear the 
ultimate risk of the firm’s insolvency. Shareholders should thus be residual claimants of the 
firm’s assets in insolvency. Jensen and Meckling21 further frame the residual claimant’s 
position in the firm as subject to an ‘agency’ paradigm where managerial control of 
corporate assets could be adverse to residual claimants’ interests, in cases where managers 
and shareholders are different persons. 
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(1990) 90 Columbia Law Rev 1332; Manuel A Utset, “Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm” (1995) 80 
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Hence, a key hypothetical bargain between shareholders and managers as championed in 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s influential thesis is that the role of corporate law is to provide a 
default set of rules22 that protects shareholders’ residual claimant interests by having their 
interests form the objective for corporations.  Shareholder primacy frames the corporate 
objective of the company, which as Easterbrook and Fischel argue, is ‘shareholder wealth 
maximisation’ as the default and commonly accepted norm that most investors would 
subscribe to.23 This objective provides a single-minded focus for managers and is an efficient 
axis for economic organisation.24 In this light, managers are disciplined, especially in publicly 
traded corporations, by the share price of the company that embodies information signals 
as to financial performance, a proxy indicator for shareholders to determine if managers are 
indeed effectively maximising the wealth of the corporation. 
The agency paradigm also frames corporate governance needs as revolving around 
controlling managerial ‘agency’ problems. This is realised through the allocation of powers 
in company law in favour of shareholders as well as the financial discipline of shareholder 
primacy upon directors. In the UK for example, shareholders are (a) the subjects of 
directors’ accountability,25 (b) the organ to exercise key powers in certain aspects of 
decision-making in the company,26 and (c) the constituents whose capital return interests 
should form the basis for corporate management.27  
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25 S172, Companies Act 2006 explicitly provides that directors’ duties are to promote the long-term success of 
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around shareholders. But most commentators are of the view that the focus on ‘shareholder value’ will 
unlikely introduce any revolutionary move in directors’ conduct towards stakeholders, see for eg Paul Davies, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New Responsibilities of Directors’ (2005) at 
http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94-
Enlightened_Shareholder_Value_and_the_New_Responsibilities_of_Directors1.pdf; Richard Williams, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law’ (2012) 35 UNSW Law Journal 360; Andrew Keay,"Section 
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and Assessment" (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 106; Elaine 
Lynch, ‘Section 172: A Ground-Breaking Reform of Director's Duties, or the Emperor's New Clothes?’ (2012) 
Company Lawyer 196. 
26 Such key aspects include the appointment and removal of directors, see s168, Companies Act 2006; the 
power to approve of certain transactions such as loans and guarantees to directors or substantial transactions 
to directors, long-term incentive arrangements and payments for loss of office, see s188ff; the power to ratify 
directors’ breaches of duties or defaults, s239; the power to direct management in a specific matter by special 
resolution, Art 4, The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008; and a power to approve (or otherwise) 
directors’ remuneration packages on a three-yearly basis, s439A. Shareholders also have extensive powers to 
determine capital restructuring, such as approval of capital reduction or redemption of shares, s641ff, 659; 
and are the key organ to determine if a takeover of the company is approved, see John Armour, Simon Deakin 
and Suzanne J. Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp266.pdf.  
27 Shareholders are treated by economists as ‘residual claimants’, meaning that their supply of capital to the 
company is under an open-ended arrangement which renders them liable to be ultimate losers if the company 
should fail. The ‘residual claimant’ status of the shareholders therefore requires protection so that managers 
do not abuse the privilege of being in control of the use and application of capital. See Armen A Alchian and 
The shareholder-centred agency-based model of corporate governance is most closely 
reflected in Anglo-American corporate law and corporate governance standards maintained 
by US and UK securities markets. Although Bruner argues that the extent of shareholder 
powers enjoyed in the UK is more extensive than in the US,28 the US corporate sector 
accepts the legitimacy of ‘shareholder value creation’ as a key corporate objective,29 and 
accountability lies to shareholders for the exercise of managerial powers.30 Indeed, 
shareholders’ formal powers31 and their activism is on the rise in the US, 32 with the growth 
of institutional shareholder influence in global capital markets. 
The shareholder-centred agency-based model of corporate governance has found 
international admiration as by the end of the 1990s,33 the success of the American economy 
draws attention to the successes of its corporate governance model. Further, studying 
incidents of corporate failure highlights that poor corporate governance can be often a 
significant factor in firm failures.34 It may be too simplistic to say that adhering to the 
conventionally accepted standards of corporate governance in accordance with the 
shareholder-centred agency-based model is a panacea for boosting corporate 
performance,35 but empirical research finds consistently that returns on investment may be 
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28 Christopher M Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common Law World (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
29 Leo E Strine Jnr, ‘Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown’ (2017) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2906875; Leo Strine Jnr,‘Our Continuing Struggle with 
the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit’ (2012) 47 Wake Forest Law Review 135. 
30 Above, and reflected in the investor-focused accountability regimes for corporations such as in securities 
regulation. 
31 Thomas and Tricker’s empirical research on shareholder voting in the US concludes that shareholders’ 
powers are more nuanced than thought, and significant influence can be exerted in proxy contests, see Randall 
S Thomas and Patrick Tricker, ‘Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, Uncontested 
Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review of the Empirical Literature’ (2017) 70 Oklahoma Law 
Review forthcoming. 
32 From the model of ‘fiduciary capitalism’ and ‘universal owners’ championed in relation to pension funds, see 
James P Hawley and Andrew T Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make 
Corporate America More Democratic (University of Pennsylvania Press 2000); Robert Monks, The New Global 
Investors (Capstone Publishing 2001), to modern forms of shareholder activism carried out by hedge funds see 
John Armour and Brian Cheffins, ‘The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’ (2012) 14 
Journal of Alternative Investments 17; Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Some Empirical Evidence’ (2013) 7 Virginia Law and Business Review 459. 
33 Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439. 
34 Abe De Jong, Douglas V De Jong, Peter Roosenboom and Gerard Mertens, “Royal Ahold: A Failure of 
Corporate Governance” (Feb 2005) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=663504; Robert 
Rosen, “Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron” (2003) 35 University of Connecticut 
Law Review 1157. 
35 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” (2009) 22 Review 
of Financial Studies 783; Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, “Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance”(2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423; Sanjai Bhagat 
and Brian Bolton, “Corporate Governance and Firm Performance” (2006) at 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Corporate_Governance-Performance.pdf; N. K. Chidambaran et al., 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from Large Governance Changes (2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108497; Charles Weir, David 
higher where companies implement such standards.36 Hence, corporate governance 
standards have become increasingly integral to global securities regulation as they are 
perceived in capital markets to be important contributors to corporate success and 
performance. Capital markets promote these standards through increasing prescription or 
legalisation for their listed companies’ adoption, in order to promote the appeal of their 
markets to investors.37   
Shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance standards appeal to institutional 
investors, who have become the most important type of investor in global corporate 
equity.38 Global assets under management total $64 trillion according to a survey carried 
out by Price Waterhouse Coopers39 and are forecast to swell to $102 trillion by 2020. As 
institutions are also minority investors in corporate equity, they rely on the existence of 
good corporate governance standards adopted by firms as being essential to protecting 
their investment interests.40  With swelling global assets under management, the 
investment management sector is increasingly powerful in influencing the terms upon which 
investments are made in securities markets. Anglo-American institutions are a significant 
institutional sector and they continue to demand robustly implemented corporate 
governance standards in listed issuers,41 many of which reflect the shareholder-centred 
                                                          
Laing and David J McKnight, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the 
Performance of UK Firms’ (2001) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=286440; Rob Bauer, 
Nadja Guenster and Roger Otten, ‘Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance in Europe. The Effect on Stock 
Returns, Firm Value and Performance’ (2003) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=444543; Andreas Bermig and Bernd Frick, ‘Board Size, 
Board Composition, and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Germany’ (2010) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623103.  
36 David F Larcker, Scott A Richardson and Irem Tuna, “How Important is Corporate Governance” (Wharton 
Working Paper, May 2005); Lawrence D Brown and Marcus L Caylor, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance’ (2004) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423; Anama Shaukat and 
Carol Padgett, ‘The UK Code of Corporate Governance: Link Between Compliance and Firm Performance’ 
(2006) at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934313; R Madhumathi and M Ranganatham, 
‘Earnings Quality, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance’ (2011) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1867869. 
37 Tobias H. Tröger, ‘Corporate Governance in a Viable Market for Secondary Listings’ (2007) 10 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business and Employment Law 89 argues that securities regulation has come to brand 
the US listed markets. 
38 See ch1, Roger M Barker and Iris H-Y Chiu, Investment Management and Corporate Governance 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017). 
39 PwC, Asset Management 2020: A Brave New World (2014) at http://www.pwc.com/us/am2020. 
40 J P Hawley and A T Williams, ‘Shifting Ground: Emerging Global Corporate-Governance Standards and the 
Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism’ (2005) 37 Environment and Planning 1995; Stuart L Gillan and Laura T Starks, 
‘Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives’ (2003) 22 
Journal of Applied Finance 134. 
41 There is much empirical evidence on the increased valuation of companies on securities markets driven by 
investor preferences where good corporate governance is instituted. See Fabio Bertoni, Michele Meoli, and 
Silvio Vismara, ‘Board Independence, Ownership Structure and the Valuation of IPOs in Continental Europe’ 
(2014) 22 Corporate Governance 116; Lawrence D Brown and Marcus L Caylor, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Firm Valuation’ (2009) 25 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 409 (arguing that there are only a few 
cherished corporate governance notions that make a difference eg independent directors); Kee H Chung and 
Hao Zhang, ‘Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership’ (2011) 46 Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 247; Armand Picou and Michael J Rubach, ‘Does Good Governance Matter to 
agency-based model of corporate governance, focusing on subjecting directors to adequate 
monitoring and accountability, and empowering shareholders to exercise powers in 
engagement and scrutiny.  
We observe the internationalisation of corporate governance standards that meet the 
needs of regulatory competition in globally competitive securities markets.42 Broad patterns 
of international convergence 43can be found in corporate governance standards that 
address the agency problem of overly-powerful management in widely-held companies.44 In 
particular, independent Board representation has become a key building block in corporate 
governance standards. Empirical literature has measured convergence in corporate 
governance standards internationally and records that notable convergence has taken place 
in standards that are particularly valued for minority shareholder protection.45 However, 
regional fragmentations in corporate governance standards46  show that the dialectics of 
contention between issuers, investors and policy-makers will continue to sustain some of 
the unique differences in corporate governance standards upheld in each securities 
market.47  
The dominance of the agency-based perspective of corporate governance in the leading 
global securities markets such as New York, London and Hong Kong has shaped both the 
content of corporate governance standards as well as international standardisation to some 
extent. Even countries that have adopted stakeholder models of corporate governance such 
                                                          
Institutional Investors? Evidence from the Enactment of Corporate Governance Guidelines’ (2006) 65 Journal 
of Business Ethics 55. 
42  Earlier literature on convergence driven by institutions are more broad-brush and optimistic, see Michael 
Useem, Investor Capitalism (NY: Basic Books 1999). See the strand of literature on nuanced forms of and 
drivers for convergence in corporate governance standards, T Yoshikawa  and AA Rasheed, ‘Convergence of 
Corporate Governance:  Critical Review and Future Directions,’ (2009) 17 Corporate Governance: An 
International  Review 388–404; Ilir Haxhi and Ruth V. Aguilera, ‘Are Codes Fostering Convergence  in Corporate 
Governance? An Institutional Perspective’ (2011) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026352, also ch11, T Yoshikawa and AA Rasheed (eds), 
Convergence in Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects (Abingdon: Palgrave Macmillan 2012).  
 Gerald Davis and Christopher Marquis, ‘The Globalization of Stock Markets and Convergence in Corporate 
Governance’ (2003) at http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/wp7.pdf; Weil 
Gotshal and Manges, Comparative Study Of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European  Union and 
Its Member States (2002) at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-
part1_en.pdf (pointing out significant convergence in Codes although not in company law). 
43 CITE HOPT, MARY O’SULLIVAN 
44 Such as the institutionalisation of independent Board representation and the independent audit committee 
of the Board, see Paul Davies and Klaus J Hopt, ‘Boards in Europe: Accountability and Convergence’ (2013) 61 
American Journal of Comparative Law 301. 
45 Mathias Siems, ‘Convergence in Corporate Governance:  A Leximetric Approach’ (2010) 35 Journal of 
Corporation Law 729; Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, ‘Determinants of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2014) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346673. 
46 Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, ‘Determinants of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2014) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346673. 
47 Detailed studies can be found in T Yoshikawa and AA Rasheed (eds), Convergence in Corporate Governance: 
Promise and Prospects (Abingdon: Palgrave Macmillan 2012). YOSHIKAWA PIECE 
as Japan are driving greater shareholder empowerment48 in a bid to reinvigorate the 
corporate sector and weed out the malaises of executive entrenchment.49 
Although the shareholder-centred agency-based model of corporate governance has 
influenced global standards and standardisation, it is fundamentally a model based on 
individualistic economic behaviour within the firm, premised upon opportunistic 
assumptions of human behaviour. It does not take into account whether economic 
behaviour adjusts in relation to the context of the ‘collective enterprise’ that is being 
pursued by constituents of the firm.50 The behaviour of individual economic constituents 
that are brought together for the common purpose of the enterprise of the firm can be 
shaped by the sociological dimension of their interactions and the sense of collective 
purpose in the common enterprise. The shareholder-centred agency-based model of 
corporate governance has little to say about how economic constituents engage in and 
organise productive activities for the purpose of enterprise, hence its relation to firm 
innovation is remote and skeletal at best. 
Shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance standards may hinder firm 
innovation51 in the following ways: 
(a) As the key tenet of such a corporate governance model is based on ‘monitoring’ ie 
Boards to monitor CEOs and executives, and shareholders to monitor Boards so that 
controlling constituents of corporate assets do not use them for selfish purposes, the 
‘monitoring’ ethos creates a culture of critical scrutiny and risk aversion, which can 
be dis-incentivising for fostering an entrepreneurial spirit or culture.52 
(b) A ‘monitoring’ model of corporate governance focuses on financial performance 
monitoring as a key means to monitor. This is because financial performance 
provides a proxy for general well-being, and monitoring at ‘arms length’ requires 
reliance upon such proxy indicators. This approach is taken by independent directors 
‘monitoring’ the rest of the Board without necessary inside knowledge53 and by 
shareholders ‘monitoring’ the Board. An emphasis on financial performance 
monitoring creates incentives towards minimising expenditure, and investment in 
research and development could be regarded as costly without bringing in sure and 
quick returns.54 
                                                          
48 See the Japanese Stewardship Code which is intended to encourage greater shareholder engagement with 
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(c) A ‘monitoring’ model of corporate governance that focuses on financial performance 
monitoring is likely to tend towards managerial short-termism as financial 
performance is scrutinised quarterly by shareholders.55  Short-termism has been 
highlighted to be a malaise for the corporate sector as it may damage the sector’s 
long-term success and its socially beneficial role in wealth creation for savers and 
investors.56 Shareholders focused upon short-termist ‘monitoring’ may indeed 
hinder corporations from engaging in long-termist expenditures and development 
that may not generate returns in the short-term. 
It may however be argued that the shareholder-centred agency-based model of corporate 
governance is relevant to innovation as a ‘monitoring’ model is able to check the exercise of 
corporate powers over assets.57 The aim is to ensure that corporate assets are used towards 
securing financial performance for the company, which protects and enhances 
shareholders’ wealth. Where promoting innovation is relevant to the financial success of the 
company, a ‘monitoring’ model could in theory prevent corporate powers from being 
exercised contrary to the purposes of wealth creation. In this way, the shareholder-centred 
agency-based corporate governance model can contribute to promoting innovation in 
relation to providing the boundaries for legitimate exercises of managerial power.  
The corporate finance perspective of shareholder primacy- that access to stock market 
finance can be improved if firms demonstrate optimal shareholder-friendly standards58- can 
be relevant for promoting innovation. As access to stock market finance can improve a 
company’s capacity to invest in innovation, adhering to agency-based corporate governance 
standards that promote shareholder rights and protection is not in conflict with a pro-
innovation strategy. 59  This seems to be especially important where stock markets are not 
already highly developed60, especially in emerging countries.61  
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101. 
Lazonick and Sullivan62 critically opine that stock market finance is not a major source of 
finance for innovation. Nevertheless, the ready access to a stock market can incentivise 
support for innovation in other ways. For example, venture capitalists may be more willing 
to invest as they eventually look to stock markets for exit, and employee stock options can 
be used to motivate a greater sense of employee commitment and productivity.  
Next, a key tenet of the ‘monitoring’ model of corporate governance is the institution of 
independent directors on the Board.63 These are regarded as well-placed to ensure that 
executive directors are not self-serving in their pursuits. However, they could be regarded as 
adverse to innovation as their monitoring emphasis could distract the Board from focusing 
on innovative and strategic directions.64 However, different commentators have also found 
in empirical research that independent directors are pro-innovation from both the agency-
based perspective of corporate governance and the resource-based perspective discussed 
below. Kor65 finds that a significant level of Board independence, such as the separation of 
CEO from the Chairman of the Board, is positively correlated with higher levels of R&D 
investments. Independence on the Board can promote strategic views towards the long-
term good of the company and mitigates the self-serving tendencies on the Board. 
However, a couple of commentators are sceptical that independent directors are a factor 
for  promoting innovation, as independent directors do not have sufficient proximity to the 
business to be strategically useful in promoting innovation.66 
Finally, empirical research has not found an adverse impact between institutional 
shareholdings and the level or commitment to innovation in companies. Indeed quite the 
converse, institutional shareholding seems positively related to promoting innovation. The 
relevance of investigating into the influence of institutional shareholding is that such 
shareholders are often regarded to be short-termist.67 Their regular legal duties of 
accountability to their beneficiaries in terms of financial performance in their investments 
make them susceptible to short-termism. Brossard et al68 examine the relationship between 
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ownership structures in a sample of 234 large European companies and their innovative 
activity in terms of R&D spending. They found that institutional investors have a positive 
impact on companies’ R&D spending. However different institutional investors seem to 
create different influences, with impatient investors being antithetical to promoting 
innovation. Pension funds are regarded as long-termist and positive influencers, while 
mutual funds are short-termist and impatient. Aghion et al69 have also come to a similar 
conclusion. They assembled a dataset of 800 major US firms over the 1990s containing time-
varying information on patent citations, ownership, R&D, and governance. They found a 
robust positive association between innovation and institutional owner ship. Their finding 
provide support for the validity of the agency-based perspective of corporate governance in 
relation to promoting innovation in companies- that the disciplinary effect of institutional 
share ownership, despite its short-termist tendencies, motivates the ‘lazy manager’ to 
engage in innovation in order to improve corporate performance.  
The empirical literature discussed above do not point to the complete incompatibility of 
shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance standards with corporate 
innovation. However, it may be argued that the connection between protecting 
shareholders and promoting innovation is still remote. The limitations of the model do not 
take into account of holistic perspectives regarding the organisation of collective productive 
activity by constituents of the firm, and may reinforce certain incentives that undercut such 
productive activity. In the next Section, we discuss findings from empirical research in terms 
of what firm-based factors matter for firm innovation. These findings show that taking a 
resource-based theory of corporate governance is much more aligned with promoting 
innovation, but such a theory has implications for how corporate governance should be 
conceived of as a model, and consequently, the corporate governance standards that should 
be regarded as optimal. These implications create tension with the shareholder-centred 
agency-based model of corporate governance, which we explore. 
B. Firm-based Factors Supporting Innovation and the Resource-based Theory of 
Corporate Governance 
Empirical literature has provided a variety of insights into the firm-based factors that 
support innovation. Our survey of such literature shows that a resource-based theory of the 
firm most closely explains the salience of these factors. 
The resource-based theory of the firm was first developed by commentators in business 
management literature who seek to shed light on why certain firms maintain a sustained 
competitive advantage over other firms and are therefore successful over the long term. 
Commentators are of the view that firms sustain a competitive advantage because they are 
able to exploit resources that are rare, valuable and not easily imitable or substitutable.70 
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These resources may range from internal resources within a firm or external resources 
associated with the firm that the firm is able to exploit successfully. Such resources may be 
‘sticky’ to the firm due to the firm’s unique connections with them, or their lack of mobility 
or homogeneity in the market.71 The resource-based theory of the firm has been developed 
intensely since the 1990s, offering an alternative account of the firm other than 
contractarianism,72 and can now be considered a relatively mature theory73 of inter-
disciplinary import, connecting with business management, organisation science, economic 
theories of the firm and corporate governance and law.74 
Innovation is promoted in a firm when resources with innovative potential are perceived 
and developed.75 The corporate governance of a firm is intimately connected with the 
perception and development of such innovative potential, as our survey from empirical 
research suggests. Corporate governance is the system in a firm that organises the exercise 
of managerial leadership and power, the structuration of functions and responsibilities 
within the firm and the mobilisation of human capital for corporate objectives.76  Corporate 
governance affects the level and quality of firm innovation in three ways. One is related to 
the firm’s access to resources at all levels in the firm; the second relates to incentives 
(affecting all levels of individuals, especially senior management) to pursue innovation and 
the third relates to structures for governing innovation in firms.  
Boards as Resource  
Our survey shows that access to resources in terms of human, social, stakeholder and 
financial capital is important in facilitating innovation in firms. Firms that promote such 
access are likely to harness more innovative potential than firms that are hamstrung in 
pursuing such access. The shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance 
standards could be a basis for hindering some forms of ‘access’, and creates tensions 
between a firm’s need to promote innovation and to comply with prevailing standards in 
order to demonstrate an appealing system of corporate governance to securities markets.  
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First, Board members are viewed as key resources for the firm’s success. From a resource-
based perspective, Board members bring expertise and skills that the company can draw 
upon for innovative strategies. Empirical research has shown that ‘inside’ directors, i.e. 
executive directors who have knowledge of the company’s business position and needs, are 
more important for corporate innovation than outside or independent directors.77 This may 
create tension with the convention in agency-based corporate governance which prizes 
independent directors as a monitoring force on Boards. Indeed the UK’s Corporate 
Governance Code requires premium-listed companies on the London Stock Exchange to fill 
half their Boards with independent directors.78 Moreover, empirical research has found that 
independent directors only bring about pro-innovation influence if they are appointed for 
their complementary expertise and skills,79 affirming a resource-based view of the 
importance of Boards to corporate innovation. The resource-based view of Board 
composition is would entail different outcomes for Board appointments from the 
shareholder-centred agency-based perspective which emphasises independence and 
directors’ ability to critically scrutinise and hold to account executive decisions.80 
Further, empirical research has found that the social capital brought in by Board members is 
extremely useful for corporate innovation. Chen81 and Kang et al82 find that directors’ social 
connections and interlocking directorates allow them to bring beneficial industry knowledge 
and ideas to the Board, generally contributing to corporate innovation. Helmers et al83 also 
find that business group affiliations and the sharing of Board members across a group of 
related companies is positively related to corporate innovation as cross-fertilisation of 
knowledge and expertise takes place between the companies. However, the agency-based 
perspective of corporate governance would unlikely support the promotion of interlocking 
directorates as cross-appointments on a number of Boards may be seen to adversely affect 
the quality of directorial independence. If a Board has to choose between an interlocking 
director with potential to promote innovation and a completely ‘outside’ candidate, it could 
face a conflict between the resource-based view of corporate governance that supports the 
promotion of innovation and adherence to the standards preferred by the conventional 
model of corporate governance. 
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There is also empirical research on incentivising corporate leadership with appropriate 
remuneration and tenure packages in order to promote innovation leadership. Empirical 
research has found that incentivising CEOs with a pay-for-performance package over the 
long-term with longer periods of vesting improves corporate innovation84 such as in relation 
to CEOs’ willingness to make corporate investments for the long-term. This may however be 
in conflict with the agency-based perspective of corporate governance that ties pay-for-
performance to shorter term financial benchmarks.85 The two corporate governance 
perspectives are however in alignment in terms of CEO tenure, that entrenchment should 
not be encouraged via long tenures as entrenchment does not incentivise leadership in 
innovation.86 However, there are mixed results as to whether CEO turnover, which reflects 
the effectiveness of an agency-based model of corporate governance is good for corporate 
innovation. Bereskin and Hsu87 has found that CEO turnover improves levels of corporate 
innovation but Manso88 finds that tolerance for failures in innovative projects and retaining 
the CEO could help improve subsequent corporate innovation.  
Shareholders as Resource 
A resource-based view of the firm also departs from the shareholder-centred agency-based 
model in relation to the salience of shareholders, especially controlling ones. 
Major shareholders who have controlling powers are often seen as important resources for 
firm innovation. As concentrated owners they are likely to have long-term commitment to 
the success of the company and willing to make R&D investments and promote 
innovation.89 The stability factor that major and long-term shareholders bring has been 
found to be positively related to innovation. This has been found even in relation to bank 
shareholdings, important in jurisdictions reliant on bank-based finance,90 and in relation to 
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friendly corporate shareholders, such as the Japanese Keiretsu.91 Further, major 
shareholders such as founder families bring social capital to the company to support the 
company’s business, for example by expanding the company’s networks.92  
Concentrated ownership is however viewed with suspicion under the conventional model of 
corporate governance, as controlling shareholders could pose agency problems to minority 
shareholders.93 A number of commentators warn that as controlling shareholders are in a 
position to benefit themselves by tunnelling and appropriating corporate assets, they may 
not be dedicated to investing corporate resources in R&D and optimally promote 
innovation.94 Perhaps it is not unequivocal that controlling shareholders are good for firm 
innovation and long-term success, and much depends on the incentives at play in the 
market and firm contexts. However it would be important not to dis-incentivise controlling 
owners from bringing a beneficial form of long-termism and stability that is facilitative for 
innovation. In this respect certain incentives for long-term controlling shareholders may 
promote innovation even if these notions are seen as offensive against standards 
safeguarded under the agency-based corporate governance model. For example, 
commentators discuss the use of unequal shareholder rights and some forms of takeover 
protection that may be beneficial for a company’s long-term success.95 
One of the key incentives for promoting innovation lies in the sense of ‘ownership’ and 
commitment that founder-controllers have for their firms. Empirical research has found that 
founder-controllers often bring with them innovative visions and a long-term commitment 
to making the enterprise successful, and are thus a highly valuable resource.96 In particular, 
there is a growing trend for founders of Silicon Valley technology companies to retain 
control through a dual-class share structure in which voting rights exceed cash flow rights. 
Founder shareholders may be motivated to insist on such voting structures due to concerns 
about the potential risk of short-termism in widely-held corporations. For example, Google’s 
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founder shareholders Larry Page and Sergey Brin have retained significant control of 55.7% 
after the initial public offer of shares despite having only 15% of the cash flow rights.97 They 
cite their long-term perspective as rationale for supporting the issue of a class of non-voting 
shares, which controversially started trading in April 2014.98 Successful companies such as 
Facebook and Alibaba are also intensely controlled by their founders.99 The commitment of 
founder-controllers is secured at a ‘corporate governance price’, such as greater or 
weighted voting rights for such founders even if this is mismatched with cash flow rights.100 
The common use of dual-class voting shares or in Snapchat’s case, the issuance of non-
voting shares to outside shareholders, are means of ensuring that founders remain in 
control of the firm’s innovative visions and that the company is relatively insulated from 
outside shareholders’ ‘short-termism’.101  Minority outside shareholders view this with great 
scepticism as unequal shareholder rights can entail agency problems.102 There is however a 
resource-based justification for incentivising such founder-controllers’ commitments by 
allowing them to maintain control.  
Although some jurisdictions have resisted dual-class shares, such as Hong Kong,103 the key 
American stock exchanges and the London Stock Exchange have allowed dual-class shares 
for some time now. The NYSE Listing Rules provide some safeguards for minority 
shareholders of listed companies that feature dual-class voting or concentrated ownership. 
The Listing Rules contain general principles to prohibit conflicts of interest, misappropriation 
of corporate opportunities104 and director/officer share transactions surrounding corporate 
communications.105 Related-party transactions however do not require shareholder voting 
except where they are issues of securities to the effect of increasing voting power by at least 
one per cent.106 These transactions may be effected after scrutiny by the audit 
committee.107 Given the traditional US context of corporate resistance towards increasing 
shareholder rights,108 it is perhaps not surprising that the NYSE Listing Rules do not feature 
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many specific shareholder protections, particularly in relation to companies with a dual-
class voting structure. That said, empirical research109 in the US shows that many companies 
featuring dual-class voting structures have voluntarily put in place mechanisms such as 
increased independent Board representation to assuage minority concerns. NASD and 
AMEX, both of which allowed dual-class voting structures, also subject such companies to 
certain corporate governance safeguards.110  
Where the London Stock Exchange is concerned, special listing rules apply to companies 
which feature a controlling shareholder in terms of voting rights.111 Such a controlling 
shareholder is required to enter into a relationship agreement with the company to 
preserve the company’s business independence. An independent director on the Board may 
determine if this is breached and call for all related-party transactions to be subject to 
minority shareholders’ veto. In practice this power is rarely used112 as there is a lack of 
further dispute resolution between independent directors and their companies if this power 
is exercised. Minority shareholders are also allowed to vote as a separate class on all 
appointments of independent directors and if a change in listing status is proposed. 
The measures above seem to reflect the compromises struck by listing authorities in 
adhering to minority shareholders’ preference for agency-based standards of corporate 
governance as well as accommodating the needs of companies that perceive key 
shareholders as important resources for the company’s continued innovative success. This 
area is however by no means settled113 and continues to draw out the tensions between the 
resource-based and agency-based theories of corporate governance. 
Distrust of significant control is pitted against the advantages of keeping founder-controllers 
incentivised. Choi114 argues that the disadvantages of agency (i.e. extraction of private 
benefits by controllers) are outweighed by the advantages of long-term corporate success. 
This is supported by other recent empirical research.115 Dallas and Barry116 find that where 
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companies implement time-phased voting, a milder form of dual-class structure which 
rewards longer term shareholders with more voting rights, such firms have not only 
outperformed financially in the long-term but have also diversified their shareholder base, 
ensuring that there is little risk of entrenchment of insiders. However, opposing empirical 
research indicates that dual-class voting structures can reduce trust in companies and may 
be avoided by some investors.117 Gompers et al also find that listed companies with dual-
class structures have by and large performed worse over the long term than those without a 
controlling shareholder.118  
Next, insulation from takeover threats, or takeover protection, may be useful in fostering 
innovation in companies. A number of commentators have found that innovation can be 
better nurtured in an environment not subject to the disruptions of takeover threats,119 
hence suggesting that anti-takeover regimes may be regarded as a pro-innovation factor.  
This is in conflict with agency-based corporate governance standards that tend to regard the 
market for corporate control as a form of discipline for management and as a key form of 
shareholder protection. L’Huillery120 finds a positive correlation between less anti-takeover 
provisions and the promotion of innovation in French companies, but is of the view that one 
should not regard shareholder-friendly rules as unequivocally pro-innovation. His research is 
highly context-specific and shareholder-friendly rules could be regarded as much-needed 
relief from prevailing protectionist corporate governance practices in the French corporate 
sector. Such mixed results perhaps suggest that some extent of takeover protection may 
benefit companies in highly open markets for corporate control, such as the UK, where the 
dominance of the agency-based corporate governance model has already produced 
concerns with regard to short-termism in the listed corporate sector.121 Executives could be 
dis-incentivised from committing to long-term investments in R&D or taking risks in pro-
innovation strategies. That said, the UK has maintained a top 5 position in the Global 
Innovation Index for the last 5 years, although slipping since 2013. 
Stakeholders and Social Capital as Resources 
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Next, empirical research has also found that corporate innovation can be promoted if a 
company engages more intensely with stakeholders and learns useful knowledge, ideas and 
feedback for its strategic development in innovation.122 Greater employee participation 
such as in the German co-determination system of corporate governance123 and a flatter 
working structure124 also facilitate corporate innovation as human capital in the company is 
made more engaged with corporate purposes and success, and therefore becomes more 
committed and productive. These findings have implications for the shareholder-centred 
agency-based model of corporate governance, as promoting innovation may require the 
elevation of stakeholders in relation to representation and participation in corporate 
governance.  
The resource-based theory of the firm focuses on different locations of innovative potential 
in resources in order to mobilise and galvanise them towards the collective enterprise of the 
firm. Hence it is not necessarily supportive of shareholder primacy. Indeed it can be argued 
that the resource-based theory of the firm resonates with alternative theories of corporate 
governance such as director primacy, director stewardship, stakeholder theory and social 
theories of the company. 
The resource-based theory of the firm arguably finds resonance with the perspective that 
the company is a ‘team’ of corporate constituents125 that contributes inputs into the 
collective enterprise of the company. As such, directors’ roles are to organise the 
mobilisation and deployment of such inputs in a coherent manner, and the exercise of their 
powers is for such purpose and not necessarily focused only on shareholder wealth 
maximisation or accountability to shareholders.126 Further this director primacy theory 
accords well with the ‘stewardship’ perspective of directors’ roles,127 which offers a view of 
directors as stewards of corporate resources for the success of the collective enterprise of 
the company. They should not merely be seen as self-interested ‘agents’ who may serve 
their own purposes or shirk their responsibilities. To an extent, this theory accords with the 
position in both US and UK corporate law as directors owe their duties to the company as a 
distinct legal personality from shareholders or groups of shareholders.128 However, as the 
company is a legal fiction, even UK law accepts that the corporate objective is the 
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‘hypothetical’ collective bargain of shareholders as a whole- which is understood as wealth 
creation in shareholders’ interests over the long term.129 Keay has since argued for the 
corporate objective to be understood as distinct and separate from shareholders’ interests, 
and his view of long-term corporate survival and success is capable of forming the practical 
basis for directors’ powers and duties under company law.130 
Further it can also be argued that where stakeholders are important locations of resource 
for innovation, a model of corporate governance that incorporates stakeholder theory could 
be highly beneficial to the company. It is argued that stakeholder connections with firms 
could be intangible assets that firms can exploit for their competitive advantage,131 such as 
employees132 and human capital connected with the firm, as well as stakeholders such as 
users and customers that bring network effects and positive reputational effects to firms. 
For example, a company like Facebook builds its success upon the trust and proliferation of 
use among its user communities, and its user base is therefore a massive resource for the 
company’s innovative developments. Amazon.com also relies on its customers to build up 
its increasingly trusted ‘feedback’ system that encourages network effects and builds up 
reputational reliability, further enhancing its core business in sales. 
Extending the stakeholder mapping of companies would also allow us to consider more 
broadly ‘social capital’ or ‘natural capital’ as being locations of resources for firms to exploit 
in terms of innovation, and such a perspective may fundamentally change our view of what 
an appropriate corporate governance model for a firm should be. Hart133 proposes that we 
should see natural resources and their sustainability as part of the resource-based theory of 
the firm, so that firms treat not only the use or exploitation of natural resources as 
important to their enterprise, but the protection and sustainability of such resources and 
the avoidance of externalities (such as pollution) as the essential counterpart to their 
enterprise too. This is because protecting sustainability and avoiding externalities address 
not only long-term sourcing for firms, but also helps to preserve firm-community relations in 
a positive manner, in order to sustain the firm’s legitimacy of its enterprise.134 Further, 
Branco and Rodrigues support the view that a firm’s social capital, i.e. its community 
relations, its influence, reputation and legitimacy are extremely important resources for the 
firm.135 Hence firms may find it essential to develop social responsibility in order to protect 
and preserve its ‘social capital’ resources. These aspects are relevant to firm innovation, as 
inspiration for innovation can be derived from social capital resources. Further, such 
resources may also be important in amplifying the positive effects of innovation in terms of 
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‘spreading the word’ or boosting the social and market appeal of firms’ innovative products 
and processes.  
If the resource-based view of the salience of stakeholders and social capital is mapped onto 
an optimal model of corporate governance, then each firm’s model of corporate 
governance, depending on its resources needs, could be very different from that 
standardised under the shareholder-centred agency-based model. There may be a case for 
the relevant firm to accommodate stakeholders in representation or participation in 
corporate governance136 or even consider embracing elements of social and public 
accountability.137 This would give rise to questions of new matrices of power allocations 
among shareholders, stakeholders and Boards.138 Chiu139 argues that in attempting to 
actualise or operationalise a stakeholder theory of corporate governance in company law, 
heavy lifting is required as power is required to be distributed away from shareholders 
under the shareholder-centred agency based model, in favour of stakeholders in an 
organised and coherent manner. Further, directors’ powers to undertake such coordination 
and organisation need to be enhanced. These implications would likely create much 
resistance in the current institutional shareholder community which largely supports the 
prevailing shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance standards. 
Structures for Governing Innovation in Companies 
Deschamps and Nelson in their book140 discuss the importance of having a governance 
structure in firms for innovation. This ensures that personal leadership and responsibility is 
being taken for stimulating, overseeing and implementing innovation. The CEO is often seen 
as a strategic lead for innovation141 and indeed in many innovative technology companies, 
the combination of CEO and founder-controller as strategic innovation lead has proved to 
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be very effective.142 However firms can innovate effectively even with different types of 
structures in place for governing innovation, so as long as there is a credible structure. In 
some firms a Chief Technical Officer may be the strategic lead for corporate innovation, in 
others a steering group of executives or business leaders could take the lead.143 
The agency-based perspective of corporate governance emphasises governing structures 
that focus on monitoring, hence the development of audit committees on the Board after 
corporate reporting scandals in the UK144 and US,145 and the development of risk 
committees on the Board after the global financial crisis 2007-9.146 As Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan147 point out, there is no theory of innovation in this corporate governance model 
and no recommended structural standards for companies in promoting and governing 
innovation. Further, there may be tensions between pursuing innovation and instituting a 
corporate culture that meets the standards of the agency-based corporate governance 
model. Moore148 points out that corporate governance standards are evolving towards a 
‘risk moderation’ role for Boards after the global financial crisis 2007-9, in order to protect 
shareholder value from excessive risk-taking, and this may be antagonistic to developing 
pro-innovation and risk-taking leadership on Boards. Mendoza et al149 also point out that 
the procedural compliance required to maintain the corporate governance standards in the 
prevailing agency-based model fosters defensive and box-ticking behaviour on Boards, and 
this may do little in stimulating innovative leadership. Perhaps this is why McCahery et al150 
argue that innovative firms avoid being subject to securities markets pressures as 
conformity with agency-based corporate governance standards is often expected in 
securities markets.  
Although we have presented both sides of the empirical research on what matters in 
corporate governance for firm innovation, we find that (a) tensions remain between 
adhering to the prevailing agency-based corporate governance standards and the corporate 
governance needs of firms that facilitate innovation; but (b) the shareholder-centred agency 
based model of corporate governance is not irrelevant to and could contribute to an extent 
to firm innovation.  We propose two sets of implications in Section C. Section C proposes 
that prevailing corporate governance standards should be adjusted if such standards are 
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adverse to the resources, structures or incentive designs that promote corporate 
innovation. Indeed, excessive prescriptions in corporate governance standards are probably 
sub-optimal for promoting innovation. However, securities markets do not seem to favour 
excessive levels of flexibility or open-endedness in corporate governance standards. In view 
of the need to create a balance between predictability and flexibility in investors’ 
expectations of today’s listed companies, Section C proposes a ‘middle way’ that preserves 
the prevailing standards of corporate governance but allows for coherently and justifiably 
developed exceptions that can be derived from the resource-based needs of firms in 
relation to innovation. In light of this proposal, Section C urges caution in respect of the 
indefatigable movement of international standardisation and convergence around 
shareholder-centred agency-based corporate governance standards. 
C. Accommodating Pro-Innovation Corporate Governance Standards 
The prevailing corporate governance standards in the UK151 and in many leading 
jurisdictions are focused on addressing the agency problem in corporate governance: 
protecting shareholder value in the corporation, upholding minority shareholder rights, 
ensuring that Boards monitor executives and that the Board is itself monitored by 
independent directors.  This model is characterised as a ‘value protection’ but not a ‘value-
creation’ model in terms of corporate strategy.152 As discussed in Section B, excessive 
concern with ‘value protection’ based on assumptions about individualistic and 
opportunistic economic behaviour may result in a myopic neglect of the more ‘optimistic’ 
perspectives regarding human behaviour and motivations in advancing a collective 
endeavour and enterprise. Corporate governance standards should incorporate facilitative 
aspects towards the latter aspects, as ultimately, both ‘value protection’ and ‘value 
creation’ perspectives aim at the same ultimate objective of corporate success, and are two 
sides of the same coin. 
There is a case to consider adjusting prevailing corporate governance standards in order not 
to dis-incentivise innovation. In the alternative, we could consider establishing a different 
set of corporate governance standards (or an alternative Code) for innovative companies. 
In the UK, corporate governance standards are largely maintained as ‘soft law’.153 Some 
securities markets such as the New York Stock Exchange have made certain corporate 
governance requirements mandatory such as the composition of independent directors and 
the institution of the audit committee, but listed issuers on the London Stock Exchange only 
have to ‘comply or explain’ in relation to the UK Corporate Governance Code. This means 
companies can explain any deviations from the Code and it is up to their shareholders to 
determine if explanations for deviation are acceptable. In theory companies could adapt the 
Code to their unique needs and explain to investors if they deviate from the Code. It will 
then be up to investors to judge if such deviation is likely to secure value for the company or 
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otherwise. The comply-or-explain approach also seems to be the prevailing approach for 
many jurisdictions and stock markets that have adopted a corporate governance code.154 As 
corporate governance codes are ‘soft law’ in nature, there is inherent flexibility for 
companies to adapt the standards in the codes to their pro-innovation needs. Hence it can 
be argued that the tensions between prevailing standards based on a shareholder-centred 
agency-based model and firm innovation needs should not be exaggerated as companies 
can make appropriate governance choices and explain to their shareholders.  
However, in reality there is considerable market pressure for what Moore describes as the 
evolution of a ‘comply-or-else’ regime.155 This is largely because early implementation of 
comply-or-explain generated boilerplate and routine explanations that were opaque and 
not meaningful, making the ‘explain’ strategy discreditable.156 Subsequent efforts at 
enhancing explanations (such as in the case of Marks & Spencer Plc discussed in Moore, 
above), especially where companies desired a unique deviation, were not met with 
welcome in capital markets. Investors suffer from information asymmetry in determining if 
unique explanations are beneficial and tend to trust standardised practices that are in 
compliance. The role of proxy advisory agencies in standardising expectations of what is 
‘good’ corporate governance is also of significant influence.157 
Explicit adjustments to established corporate governance codes such as the UK Corporate 
Governance Code would likely face many challenges, even if framed towards the purposes 
of promoting firm innovation. The UK Corporate Governance Code for example, is a product 
of influences increasingly dominated by the investment sector. 158  This sector has every 
incentive to shape a shareholder-centred set of corporate governance standards that 
protect investment value and minority shareholder rights. Policy-makers also promote the 
importance of institutional investors as they desire the investment sector to facilitate 
market-based governance for the corporate sector and minimise the need for state 
intervention and regulation.159 In this light, Code standards that are consonant with 
shareholders’ preferences are unlikely to be pared down. Further, corporate governance 
codes play a signalling role to investors, indicating that companies listed in the securities 
market are well-governed and promising. Their ‘branding role’ in boosting the appeal of 
securities markets160 to investors, especially institutional investors, is likely to be protected 
by securities markets and listing authorities. There is likely to be a degree of anxiety and 
reluctance to adjust code standards in a manner that is seen to deviate from the 
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shareholder-centred agency-based model. Pressures from international convergence would 
also make such adjustments unlikely to be pursued. The adoption of similar corporate 
governance standards in many securities markets around the world has led to the general 
acceptance of corporate governance codes as being essential capital markets institutions.161  
Global competitive pressures tend towards sustaining or encouraging more convergence of 
corporate governance standards.  
McCahery and Vermeulen162 posit that an alternative set of corporate governance standards 
could be established for innovative companies. It can be argued that having a set of 
alternative corporate governance standards is superior to the situation of open-ended 
flexibility in deviation from prevailing standards. Recognition for different standards that 
may be useful for companies that engage in significant amounts of innovation, such as in 
technology, and formalisation into a different code give such different standards an appeal 
of legitimacy. This is important for companies in their interface with capital markets as the 
existence of governance standards fosters investor trust. However developing such a set of 
standards would also entail defining its scope of application, and justifying why carving out 
‘innovative companies’ as a sector distinguished from the listed corporate sector is 
appropriate. Would technology, automotive or pharmaceutical companies be regarded as 
innovative while retail companies may not? Establishing an alternative code for a yet-to-be-
defined alternative sector raises boundary issues, and also arbitrage issues, although it can 
be argued that competition between codes can lead to greater market choice in optimal 
governance models for listed companies. 
For now we argue that an immediately practicable and  incremental approach lies in 
adjusting prevailing corporate governance standards, in the manner of carving out a 
recognised exception to the standards on the ground of ‘resource-based justifications’. This 
is a refinement of the ‘comply-or-explain’ model which suffers from the perception problem 
that ‘comply’ is ideal, while ‘explain’, which relates to an uncharted territory, raises investor 
risk. We are of the view that by formally carving out exceptions, such exceptions can be 
subject to general principles that reflect companies’ resource-based needs that promote 
innovation. This provides more transparency and predictability for investors, enhancing the 
acceptability and legitimacy of the exceptions. The principles for the exceptions can be 
derived from common themes in empirical findings discussed above. We illustrate how such 
an ‘exceptions’ regime may work. 
Establishing Principled Resource-based Exceptions 
The key features of many corporate governance codes deal with Boards and emphasise 
Boards’ roles in effective monitoring and ‘value protection’. The excessive prioritisation of 
‘value protection’ priorities may cause Boards to make strategic trade-offs between value 
protection priorities and ‘value creation’ strategies. Hence we make a few suggestions in 
                                                          
161 See Chapter I, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2015 at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2615021e.pdf?expires=1500891878&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B25
097F0D5E0194BFBD901ABB7BA7545. 
162 Joseph McCahery and Erik P Vermeulen, ‘Corporate Governance and Innovation Venture Capital, Joint 
Ventures, and Family Businesses’ (ECGI Working Paper 2006) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894785. 
terms of exceptions to the standards relating to Board appointments, design of executive 
remuneration and Board responsibilities in order to accommodate pro-innovation needs 
that would benefit from a resource-based perspective. 
Balancing ‘Monitoring’ Appointments with ‘Resource-based’ Appointments 
Under the shareholder-centred agency-based model of corporate governance, non-
executive directors are to be appointed to the Board to serve primarily in the capacity of 
‘financial monitor’.163 They are responsible for scrutinising financial performance, the 
‘integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk 
management’.164 Such responsibilities are clearly in the vein of chiefly ‘defensive’ or ‘value 
protecting’ purposes.  
In order to boost ‘monitoring’ power on Boards, the composition of non-executive or 
independent directors is often prescribed. The UK Corporate Governance Code recommends 
half of the Board to be non-executive and independent.165 Independence requirements are 
also applied for the membership of the nomination committee and the majority of 
membership of the remuneration or audit committees of the Board.166 These profile 
requirements pertain to non-executive directors’ ‘monitoring’ role especially in relation to 
the work of the independent committees of the Board in relation to remuneration design, 
audit and risk management.167  Further, the UK Corporate Governance also designates the 
senior independent director to be the ‘monitoring’ lead and to interact with shareholders.168  
We argue that first, the prescriptive composition requirements should be subject to 
exceptions where resource-based justifications exist. Perhaps an exception can be created 
to moderate the requirement of 50% independence to ‘at least 25%’, so that room can be 
made for resource-based appointments that can be explained. Section B has pointed out 
how Boards are an important resource, and at times, higher levels of executive 
appointments or even certain interlocking directorial appointments could be important 
resources for the firm. 
Next, we suggest that it would be a missed opportunity for appointments of non-executive 
directors to only focus on their financial monitoring roles, as empirical research has found 
that non-executive directors, especially those with ‘social capital’, can bring new ideas and 
strategic input169 that is useful for the company’s promotion of innovation.170 Further, with 
the role of the senior independent director being defined to align with the company’s 
accountability to shareholders, perhaps the role of ‘non-executive’ director should be left 
more open and welcome to a resource-based perspective of their relevance. The UK 
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Corporate Governance Code sets out that appointments to the Board are to be evaluated in 
terms of the balance of skills, knowledge, independence and experience.171 We urge that 
appointments to the Board, whether executive or non-executive, should take into account 
of the resource-based profile of the candidate, and that Board responsibilities be defined 
more holistically, including the needs of advancing the collective enterprise of the company, 
besides ‘value protection’ responsibilities. This would mean explicitly widening the scope of 
non-executive and independent director’s scope of oversight, and requires adjustment on 
the part of the nomination committee’s selection processes. 
Under the UK Code, the nomination committee is tasked with selecting suitable executive 
and non-executive directors.172 Empirical research shows that the characteristics of the 
nomination committee members affect their selection.173 As the committee has three 
members and a majority are to be independent and non-executive,174 in selecting non-
executive directors, the committee is likely to apply criteria that are most pertinent to 
candidates’ ‘monitoring’ qualities, and may play down the importance of strategic 
capabilities. We urge a more broad-minded application of appointment criteria to non-
executive and independent directors, looking conjunctively at their strategic abilities and 
the ‘resources’ they can contribute to the company. The nomination committee should be 
required to report on both the agency-based as well as resource-based justifications for 
Board appointments in the company’s annual report.  
One of the implications of widening the scope of non-executive or independent directors’ 
responsibilities is that perhaps such directors could be awarded performance-linked 
remuneration in order to incentivise them to bring their ‘resources’ to contribute to the 
strategic needs of the company. At present under the UK Code, non-executive directors are 
tied to a monitoring role and cannot be remunerated in a manner linked to the company’s 
performance.175 The Code is antagonistic to this suggestion as such remuneration is 
perceived to likely jeopardise non-executive directors’ independence or objectivity. It may 
also be argued that if there are persons interested enough in contributing to the strategy of 
the company’s business in this manner, they should not be put up for non-executive 
appointments in the first place. However, being an executive director is demanding, and 
suitable or talented people may not wish to make that commitment if tied up elsewhere. It 
can be useful to have a non-executive director on Board who needs to be appointed in that 
capacity only perhaps because s/he holds an executive directorship elsewhere. If we take a 
resource-based perspective of corporate governance, there is no reason why non-executive 
directors who contribute to the company’s success should not be rewarded in a form of 
performance-linked remuneration.176  We see such an exception to the Code’s standards as 
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Nomination Committees’ (2012) 20 Corporate Governance: An International Review 474. 
174 Chapter B.2.1 of the Code. 
175 Chapter D.1.3 of the Code. 
176 Roger M Barker, ‘Re-Designing Corporate Governance to Promote Innovation’ (GUBERNA paper 2016). 
being consistent with the appointment of non-executive directors based on resource-based 
justifications. 
A Different Look at Board Diversity 
Board appointments are now affected by policy initiatives that seek to encourage greater 
diversity, especially gender diversity.177 Although appointments are made on a merit basis, 
there is a need to ensure that there is adequate diversity to meet the requirements of 
‘balance’. The debate on gender diversity that exploded after the global financial crisis 2007-
9 focused on the likelihood of women’s risk moderation role on Boards, seen as essential to 
curb excessive risk-taking in business strategy.178 The impetus behind this initiative, and 
other forms of diversity are likely to be more socially-motivated as empirical findings on the 
performance relation to diverse Boards are mixed.179 One could view gender diversity as 
bringing about a change in dynamics that could benefit the Board’s decision-making 
process.180 However such arguments are also causally flimsy and could be based on 
stereotyping the qualities women bring to boards.181 The call for more diversity on Boards is 
curiously not connected to a more resource-based rhetoric. Indeed such a view may make 
diversity arguments (and not just gender diversity) more legitimate and convincing, 
especially since empirical research supports the link between diversity on Boards, the 
promotion of new strategic thinking and increased corporate innovation.182 It is also 
opined183 that from a resource-based perspective, diversity on Boards also improves social 
and stakeholder legitimacy, as well as engagement, if these are important to the company’s 
needs. 
A Strategy and Innovation Committee of the Board 
We are concerned that the functions of the Board, especially in relation to its dedicated 
committees, are not susceptible to the promotion of corporate innovation for long-term 
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Resource Dependency Perspective’ (2009) Management Online Review 1. 
development and success. This is because important committees such as the audit 
committee and remuneration committee are focused on ‘value protection’ in respect of 
their roles. The audit committee has oversight of the integrity of financial reporting, the role 
of internal control and the appointment or removal of external auditors, while the 
remuneration committee is to ensure appropriate executive remuneration design that 
promotes pay-for-performance and no rewards for failure.184 In general, Vermeulen et al185 
perceive that corporate Boards are too focused on compliance and monitoring issues today 
instead of providing strategic leadership, which is a resource-loss for companies.  
We propose that Boards may consider establishing a Strategy and Innovation Committee in 
order to provide balance vis a vis the other Board responsibilities and committees. Such a 
Committee could then be responsible for instituting a corporate-wide innovation strategy 
and its oversight. Such a Committee does not replace the Board in strategic contributions as 
every director can bring a ‘resource-based’ contribution to the Board. Many Boards are not 
inordinately large,186 and the Committee’s role could be to coordinate the ‘resource’ profiles 
of all Board members,187 while some focus on ‘monitoring’ type functions in relation to the 
audit or remuneration committees. Such a Committee would be different in composition 
from the Committees dedicated to value-protection, and could indeed comprise of a 
balanced slate of executive and non-executive directors committed to exploring the 
exploitation of innovation by the company. The Committee can also be positioned to 
develop an enterprise-wide strategy and investigate all levels of the firm in order to 
encourage and motivate innovation. Articulating the separate importance of ‘strategy and 
innovation’ which some may take for granted as an inherent Board task, can contribute 
towards reinstating the importance of ‘entrepreneurial’ leadership on the Board, a task 
which Vermeulen et al188 critically opine has been left by the wayside in many companies. 
We also propose that the Strategy and Innovation Committee could be responsible for 
developing stakeholder engagement and channels for representation or participation if this 
is warranted from a resource-based perspective. Where the network effects of 
stakeholders, reputational maintenance or matters of feedback by stakeholders are 
important to the company as ‘resources’, as discussed in Section B, the Committee could 
develop strategies for stakeholder engagement that may create new avenues of 
participation and/or accountability. 
The incremental suggestions above add formalised and resource-based exceptions and 
features to existing corporate governance standards. They are not uncontroversial as 
investors can perceive a moderation of ‘monitoring’ emphases to be detrimental to their 
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185 Erik Vermeulen, Mark Fenwick and Masato Hisatake, ‘Intelligent Cars Inc. - Governance Principles to Build a 
Disruptive Company’ (2016) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2823006. 
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187 Allen Kaufman and Ernie Englander, ‘A Team Production Model of Corporate Governance’ (2005) 19 
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interests, or stakeholder engagement to be a dilution of shareholder primacy. This article 
does not set out to present a perfect reconciliation, as Sections A and B have already 
explored the context of tensions and dilemmas between the shareholder-centred agency-
based corporate governance standards favoured by investors and deviations from those 
standards for pro-innovation needs in companies. We believe that the proposed 
adjustments are ultimately moderations of existing standards that seek to mitigate the 
straitjacketing effects of prevailing corporate governance standards perceived by some 
companies in accessing or deploying resources to develop innovation. Prevailing corporate 
governance standards have developed such a strong leaning towards investor interests that 
some balance towards the other constituents in corporate governance may not be 
unwarranted.  
Rethinking Corporate Governance Standardisation 
In light of our approach of establishing principled exceptions to prevailing corporate 
governance standards, it is also worth taking a step back and critically questioning whether 
the movement of corporate governance standardisation in securities markets is optimal. 
Standardisation in Corporate Governance Codes tends towards inflexibility over the long 
term.189 This may also apply to a regime of principled-exceptions to Code standards. In the 
contests between flexibility and predictability, between business and investors, 
compromises could be made in the development of Code standards as well as principles of 
exceptions, resulting in the proliferation of ‘generally-accepted’ positions that become 
inflexible and quasi-mandatory.  
The factors that stimulate innovation discussed above, i.e. access to a range of resources, 
designing incentives for innovation to occur at all levels in a firm, and having a range of 
structures that would support innovation, are open-ended in nature and would likely 
benefit from less straitjacketing standards. Yablon190 warns that the innovation mindset and 
ethos seek to explore the ‘weird and wonderful’ rather than the conventional. Hence it 
could be optimal for companies to be subject only to minimal governance practices so that 
their resource-based opportunities are not constrained. Excessive standardisation in 
corporate governance that is purported towards promoting innovation may ultimately 
achieve the antithesis of what is desired.  
However, scaling back the development of corporate governance standards or codes is 
unlikely given the developments since the 1990s. The UK Corporate Governance Code has 
grown in volume and detail over each review, and some corporate governance practices 
have hardened into binding obligations. Since the establishment of the Cadbury Code of 
Corporate Governance in 1992, the Code has incorporated concerns of executive 
remuneration in 1995,191 consolidated requirements of directorial independence after the 
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Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 1017. 
191 Richard Greenbury, Report: Directors’ Remuneration (17 Jul 1995). In 1995 the governance issue in the 
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Higgs Review of 2003,192 and strengthened the Board’s monitoring role of executives, as 
well as shareholders’ monitoring of Boards since the Walker Review after the global 
financial crisis 2007-9.193 Binding obligations include the shareholder’s advisory vote for 
executive remuneration packages introduced in 2002194 now hardened into a 3-yearly 
binding vote.195 In the US, corporate governance issues have also become increasingly 
addressed in securities regulation, from the mandatory requirements of internal control and 
audit committees in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002196 to the post-crisis Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
which provides for the mandatory shareholder vote on executive remuneration.197 
In this context, we see the moderation of the compliance environment for corporate 
governance, and not a major overhaul or abolition, as the only possible and incremental 
step that addresses companies’ pro-innovation needs. The freedoms that companies need 
to exploit innovative potential in their resources ultimately have to be balanced against the 
need for investor scrutiny and accountability. The development of ‘principles of exceptions’ 
to prevailing standards allows the resource-based theory of corporate governance to gain 
traction, by compelling companies to articulate and explain how the exceptions allow them 
to leverage upon their resources and meet innovation needs. This regime is less likely to 
undermine the established sense of trust that investors have in shareholder-centred agency-
based corporate governance standards but goes one step further. The creation of resource-
based exceptions to corporate governance compliance encourages investors to actively 
engage with corporate governance practices and their connection with corporate success. 
Investors should not just passively expect corporate compliance with prevailing standards. 
We see this proposal as being consistent with the ‘stewardship’ development in shareholder 
engagement with companies.  
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The UK has pioneered a Stewardship Code since 2010,198 in order to encourage investors to 
engage more deeply but constructively with their investee companies, so that their financial 
monitoring role can also bring about wider social benefits in terms of their sectoral 
monitoring. However, although ‘stewardship’ empowers and legitimises investors to engage 
with companies more intensely beyond the formal mechanisms in company law, such as at 
general meetings, it also requires investors to make adequate disclosure of their 
engagement and voting policies and demonstrate that their stewardship is for the overall 
benefit for the company as a whole.199 As the investment sector is more prepared to 
dialogue with companies on their corporate governance in the ‘stewardship’ era,200 
proposed that our approach of developing principles of exceptions for companies to meet 
their resource-based objectives in promoting innovation is timely for a maturing investment 
sector. Such a regime supports engaged capital markets where healthy levels of disclosure 
are compelled and supported by adequate levels of investor dialogue and engagement.201 
D. Conclusion 
A company’s pro-innovation needs are often met by the exploitation of its resources, widely 
defined. The resource-based theory of the firm provides immense empirical insights into 
how a firm’s corporate governance factors can contribute to promoting innovation. These 
implications may however conflict with the prevailing standards of corporate governance 
imposed on many securities markets for listed companies, which have developed based on 
theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centred and agency-based theory of the firm. 
Although prevailing corporate governance standards can to an extent support firm 
innovation, tensions are created in some circumstances where companies pit their 
corporate governance compliance against resource-based needs that promote innovation. 
Such tensions have arisen in controversies surrounding listed companies that issue dual 
class stock that protect founder-members’ innovative visions for the company, or in 
companies with influential controlling shareholders, or where stakeholders may be 
important for corporate success. We argue that what is at the heart of many of these 
controversies is a contest between a resource-based perspective of the firm that seeks to 
maximise innovation and enterprise opportunities as a collective endeavour, and the 
agency-based perspective pf the firm that seeks to mitigate the power of influential 
constituents such as directors or controlling shareholders in order to protect minority 
investors.  
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In the present context of steady internationalisation and convergence in corporate 
governance standards in global securities markets towards a shareholder-centred agency-
based model, we argue that there is a need to provide some room for accommodating the 
resource-based needs for companies in relation to promoting innovation. These needs may 
require deviation from prevailing corporate governance standards, and we propose a 
structured, coherent and formalised regime for such exceptions to occur in a way that 
would be subject to adequate investor scrutiny and market governance. This incremental 
approach is likely to be more acceptable and constructive in today’s securities markets and 
is able to advance the importance of the resource-based theory of the firm that promotes 
long-term success of the corporate sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
